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Abstract. Formal learning theory formalizes the process of inferring
a general result from examples, as in the case of inferring grammars
from sentences when learning a language. Although empirical evidence
suggests that children can learn a language without responding to the
correction of linguistic mistakes, the importance of Teacher in many other
paradigms is significant. Instead of focusing only on learner(s), this work
develops a general framework—the supervised learning game (SLG)—to
investigate the interaction between Teacher and Learner. In particular,
our proposal highlights several interesting features of the agents: on the
one hand, Learner may make mistakes in the learning process, and she
may also ignore the potential relation between different hypotheses; on
the other hand, Teacher is able to correct Learner’s mistakes, eliminate
potential mistakes and point out the facts ignored by Learner. To reason
about strategies in this game, we develop a modal logic of supervised
learning (SLL). Broadly, this work takes a small step towards studying
the interaction between graph games, logics and formal learning theory.
Keywords: Formal Learning Theory, Modal Logic, Dynamic Logic, Undecid-
ability, Graph Games
1 Introduction
Formal learning theory formalizes the process of inferring a general result from
examples, as in the case of inferring grammars from sentences when learning a
language. A good way of understanding this general process is by treating it as
a game played by Learner and Teacher. It starts with a class of possible worlds,
where one of them is the actual one chosen by Teacher. Learner’s aim is to get to
know which one it is. Teacher inductively provides information about the world,
and whenever receiving a piece of information Learner picks a conjecture from
the class, indicating which one she thinks is the case. Different success conditions
for Learner can be defined. In this article we require that at some finite stage of
the procedure Learner decides on a correct hypothesis. This kind of learnability
is known as finite identification [17].
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Although empirical evidence suggests that children can learn a language with-
out responding to the correction of linguistic mistakes [13], the importance of
teachers in many other paradigms is significant. For instance, in the paradigm
of learning from queries and counterexamples [1], Teacher has a strong influence
on whether the process is successful. Moreover, results in [12] suggest that a
helpful Teacher may make learning easier. In this work, instead of focusing only
on Learner, we highlight the interactive nature of learning.
As noted in [12], a concise model for characterizing the interaction between
Learner and Teacher is the sabotage game (SG). A SG is played on a graph with
a starting node and a goal node, and it goes in rounds: Teacher first cuts an edge
in the graph, then Learner makes a step along one of the edges still available.
Both of them win iff Learner arrives at the goal node [19]. From the perspective
of formal learning theory, this step-by-step game depicts a guided learning situ-
ation. Say, a natural interpretation is the situation of theorem proving. In this
case, the starting node is given by axioms, the goal node stands for the theorem
to be proved, other nodes represent lemmas conjectured by Learner, and edges
capture Learner’s possible inferences between them. Inferring is represented by
moving along those edges. The information provided by Teacher can be treated
as his feedback, i.e., removing edges to eliminate wrong inferences. The success
condition is given by the winning condition: the learning process has been suc-
cessful if Learner reaches the goal node, i.e., proving the theorem. For the general
correspondence between SG and learning models, we refer to [12].
However, we would argue that this application of SG gives a highly restricted
model of learning. For instance,
• Intuitively, all links in the graph are inferences conjectured by Learner, which
may include mistakes. From the perspective of Learner, the wrong inferences
cannot be distinguished from the correct ones. Although it is reasonable to
assume that Teacher is able to do so, SG does not highlight that Learner
lacks perfect information. Besides, Teacher in SG has to remove a link in
each round, which is overly restrictive.
• Links removed represent wrong inferences between lemmas. So, whether or
not a link deleted occurs in Learner’s current proof (i.e., the current process)
is important. If the proof includes a mistake, any inference after the mistake
should not make sense. However, if a potential transition having not occurred
in the proof is wrong, Learner can continue with her current proof. Clearly,
SG cannot distinguish between these two cases.
• The game does not distinguish between all the various ways Learner can
reach the goal. That is, as long as Learner has come to the right conclusion,
the game cannot tell us whether Learner has come to this conclusion in a
coherent way. Reaching the correct hypothesis by wrong transitions is not
reliable. The well-known Gettier cases [11] where one has justified true belief,
but not knowledge are also examples of situations in which one wrongly
reaches the right conclusion. Thus, the theory developed in [12] is subject to
the Gettier problems.
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• Teacher can only delete links to decide what Learner will not learn, and
thus he only teaches what Learner has already conjectured. However, during
the process of learning, ‘possibilities may also be ignored due to the more
questionable practice if assuming that one of the theories under consideration
must be true. And complexity can come to be ignored through convention
or habit’ ([16], pp. 260). Hence, it is natural to assume that Learner may
ignore the correct relation between different hypotheses.
In this paper, we therefore propose a new game, called the supervised learning
game (SLG). This game differs from the SG on several accounts, motivated by
the mentioned restrictions. Before introducing its definition, we first define some
auxiliary notions.
Let S = 〈w0, w1, ..., wn〉 be a non-empty, finite sequence. We use e(S) to
denote its last element. Define Set(S) := {〈w0, w1〉, 〈w1, w2〉, ..., 〈wn−1, wn〉}.
For the particular case when S is a singleton, Set(S) := ∅. Besides, for any
〈wi, wi+1〉 ∈ Set(S), define S|〈wi,wi+1〉 := 〈w0, w1, ..., wu〉, where 〈wu, wu+1〉 =
〈wi, wi+1〉 and 〈wu, wu+1〉 6= 〈wj , wj+1〉 for any j < i. Intuitively, S|〈wi,wi+1〉 is
obtained by deleting all elements occurring after wu from S, where 〈wu, wu+1〉
is the first occurrence of 〈wi, wi+1〉 in S. Say, when S = 〈a, b, c, a, b〉, we have
S|〈a,b〉 = 〈a〉. Now let us introduce SLG.
Definition 1 (SLG). A SLG 〈W,R1, R2, 〈s〉, g〉 is given by a graph 〈W,R1, R2〉,
the starting node s and the goal node g. A position of the game is a tuple 〈Ri1, S
i〉.
The initial position 〈R01, S
0〉 is given by 〈R1, 〈s〉〉. Round n + 1 from position
〈Rn1 , S
n〉 is as follows: first, Learner moves from e(Sn) to any of its R1-successors
s′; then Teacher does nothing or acts out one of the following three choices:
(1). Extend Rn1 with some 〈v, v
′〉 ∈ R2;
(2). Transfer 〈Sn, s′〉 to 〈Sn, s′〉|〈v,v′〉 by cutting 〈v, v
′〉 from Set(〈Sn, s′〉)\R2;
(3). Delete some 〈v, v′〉 ∈ (R1 \R2) \ Set(〈Sn, s′〉) from R1.
The new position, denoted 〈Rn+11 , S
n+1〉, is 〈Rn1 , S
n〉 (when Teacher does noth-
ing), 〈Rn1 ∪{〈v, v
′〉}, 〈Sn, s′〉〉 (when he chooses (1)), 〈Rn1 \{〈v, v
′〉}, 〈Sn, s′〉|〈v,v′〉〉
(if he acts as (2)), or 〈Rn1 \ {〈v, v
′〉}, 〈Sn, s′〉〉 (if he chooses (3)). It ends if
Learner arrives at g through an R2-path 〈s, ..., g〉 or cannot make a move, with
them winning in the former case and losing in the latter.
Intuitively, the clause for Learner illustrates that she cannot distinguish the
links starting from the current position. The sequence Si is her current learning
process, which may include mistakes; R1 represents Learner’s possible inferences
between conjectures; and R2 is the correct inferences. For any position 〈R
n
1 , S
n〉
we have Set(Sn) ⊆ Rn1 . Besides, both (2) and (3) above are concerned with
the case that Teacher eliminates wrong transitions, but there is an important
difference. The former one concerns the case that Teacher gives Learner a coun-
terexample to show that she has gone wrong somewhere in her current process, so
Learner should move back to the conjecture right before the wrong transition. In
contrast, (3) illustrates that Teacher eliminates a wrong transition conjectured
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that has not occurred in Learner’s process yet, therefore this action does not
modify Learner’s current process.
From the winning condition, we know that both the players cooperate with
each other. It is important to recognize that Learner’s action does not conflict
with her cooperative nature: she makes an effort to achieve the goal in each
round. Moreover, it is not hard to see that players cannot win when there exists
no R2-path from the starting node to the goal node. This is reasonable, since
their interaction makes sense only when the goal is learnable. The correlation
between the situation of theorem proving and SLG is shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Correspondence between theorem proving and supervised learning games.
Theorem Proving Supervised Learning Games
Axioms Starting node
Theorem Goal node
Lemmas conjectured by Learner Other states except the starting state
and the goal state
Learner’s possible inference from a to b R1-edge from a to b
Correct inference from a to b R2-edge from a to b
Inferring b from a Transition from a to b
Proof for a R1-sequence from the starting node to a
Correct proof for a R1-sequence S from the starting node to
a and Set(S) ⊆ R2
Giving a counterexample to the inference
from a to b in the proof S
Modifying S to S|〈a,b〉 (〈a, b〉 ∈ Set(S))
Giving a counterexample to the conjec-
tured inference from a to b not in the
proof S
Deleting 〈a, b〉 from R1 (〈a, b〉 6∈ Set(S))
Pointing out a potential inference from
a to b not conjectured by Learner before
Extending R1 with 〈a, b〉
Remark 1. The interpretation of SLG presented in Table 1 can be easily adapted
to characterize other paradigms in formal learning theory, such as language learn-
ing and scientific inquiry. More generally, any single-agent games, such as soli-
taire and computer games, can be converted into SLG. Say, the player (Learner)
does not know the correct moves well, but she knows the starting position and
the goal position, and has some conjectures about the moves of the game. Be-
sides, she can be taught by Teacher: she just attempts to play it, while Teacher
instructs her positively (by revealing more correct moves) or negatively (by point-
ing out incorrect moves, in which case Learner may have to be moved back to
the moment previous to the first incorrect move, if she made any).
Example 1. Let us consider a simple example of SLG, as depicted in Figure 1.
The starting node is a and the goal node is G. We show that players have a
winning strategy by depicting the game to play out as follows. Learner begins
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with moving along the only available edge to node b. Teacher in his turn can make
〈e, f〉 ‘visible’ to Learner by adding it to R1. Then, Learner proceeds to move
along 〈b, c〉, and Teacher extends 〈b, e〉 to R1. Afterwards, Learner continues on
the only option 〈c,G〉. Although she now has already arrived at the goal node,
her path 〈a, b, c, G〉 is not an R2-sequence. So, Teacher can remove 〈b, c〉 moving
Learner back to node b. Next, Learner has to move to e, and Teacher can delete
〈c,G〉 from R1. Finally, Learner can arrives at G in 2 steps with Teacher doing
nothing. Now we have Set(〈a, b, e, f,G〉) ⊆ R2, so they win.
a
b
c
e
G
f
1, 2
2 1, 2
1
1
2
2
Fig. 1. A SLG game (R1 is labelled with ‘1’ and R2 with ‘2’).
To reason about players’ strategies in SLG, in what follows we will study
SLG from a modal perspective. Sabotage modal logic (SML) [5] is known to
be a suitable tool to characterize SG, which extends basic modal logic with a
sabotage modality 〈−〉ϕ stating that there is an edge such that, ϕ is true at
the evaluation node after deleting the edge from the model. However, given the
differences between SG and SLG, we will develop a novelmodal logic of supervised
learning (SLL) to capture SLG.
Outline. Section 2 introduces SLL along with its application to SLG and some
preliminary observations. Section 3 studies the expressivity of SLL. Section 4
investigates the model checking problem and satisfiability problem for SLL. We
end this paper by Section 5 on conclusion and future work.
2 Modal Logic of Supervised Learning (SLL)
To be an ideal tool, the logic SLL should at least be able to precisely express
players’ actions and depict their winning strategies. In this section, we first in-
troduce its language and semantics. Then we analyze its applications to SLG.
Finally, we make various observations, including some logical validities and re-
lations between SLL and other logics.
2.1 Language and Semantics
We begin by considering the action of Learner. In SML, the standard modality
♦ characterizes the transition from a node to its successors and corresponds
well to Learner’s actions in SG. However, operator ♦ is not any longer sufficient
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in our case. Note that after Teacher cuts a link 〈w, v〉 from Learner’s current
process S, Learner should start from w with the new path S|〈w,v〉 in the next
round. Therefore, the desired operator should remember the history of Learner’s
movements.
To capture Teacher’s action, a natural place to start is by defining opera-
tors that correspond to link addition and deletion. There is already a body of
literature on logics of these modalities, such as the sabotage operator 〈−〉 and
the bridge operator 〈+〉 [3]. As mentioned, each occurrence of 〈−〉 in a formula
deletes exactly one link whereas the bridge operator adds links stepwise to mod-
els. Yet, including these two modalities is still not enough. For instance, we need
to take into account whether or not a link deleted by Teacher is a part of the
path of Learner’s movements. We now introduce SLL. First, let us define its
language.
Definition 2 (Language L). Let P be a countable set of propositional atoms.
The formulas of L are recursively defined in the following way:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | ϕ | 〈−〉1ϕ | 〈−〉2ϕ | 〈+〉ϕ
where p ∈ P. Notions ⊤, ⊥, ∨ and → are as usual. Besides, we use , [−]1, [−]2
and [+] to denote the dual operators of , 〈−〉1, 〈−〉2 and 〈+〉 respectively.
Several fragments of L will be studied in the following of the article. For
brevity, we use a notational convention listing in subscript all modalities of the
corresponding language. For instance, L is the fragment of L that has only the
operator  (besides Boolean connectives ¬ and ∧); L〈−〉2 has only the modality
〈−〉2; L〈−〉1 has only the modality  and 〈−〉1, etc. We now proceed to define
the models of SLL.
Definition 3 (Models, Pointed Models and Frames). A model of SLL
is a tuple M = 〈W,R1, R2, V 〉, where W is a non-empty set of possible worlds,
Ri∈{1,2} ⊆W
2 are two binary relations and V : P→ 2W is a valuation function.
F = 〈W,R1, R2〉 is a frame. Let S be an R1-sequence, i.e., Set(S) ⊆ R1. We
name 〈M, S〉 a pointed model, and S an evaluation sequence. Usually we write
M, S instead of 〈M, S〉.
For brevity, we call R1 the conjectured relation and R2 the correct relation.
Besides, we use M to denote the class of pointed models and M• the class of
pointed models whose sequence S is a singleton. Before introducing the seman-
tics, let us define some preliminary notations.
Assume that M = 〈W,R1, R2, V 〉 is a model, w ∈ W and i ∈ {1, 2}. We
use Ri(w) := {v ∈ W |Riwv} to denote the set of Ri-successors of w in M.
Besides, for a sequence S, define Ri(S) := Ri(e(S)), i.e., the Ri-successors of a
sequence S are exactly the Ri-successors of its last element. For brevity, we also
use S; v to denote the sequence extending S with node v. Moreover,M⊖〈u, v〉 :=
〈W,R1 \ {〈u, v〉}, R2, V 〉 is the model obtained by removing 〈u, v〉 from R1, and
M⊕ 〈u, v〉 := 〈W,R1 ∪ {〈u, v〉}, R2, V 〉 is obtained by extending R1 in M with
〈u, v〉. We now have enough background to introduce the semantics of SLL.
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Definition 4 (Semantics). Let 〈M, S〉 be a pointed model and ϕ ∈ L. The
semantics of SLL is defined as follows:
M, S  p⇔ e(S) ∈ V (p)
M, S  ¬ϕ⇔M, S 6 ϕ
M, S  ϕ ∧ ψ ⇔M, S  ϕ and M, S  ψ
M, S  ϕ⇔ ∃v ∈ W s.t. R1e(S)v and M, S; v  ϕ
M, S  〈−〉1ϕ⇔ ∃〈v, v′〉 ∈ Set(S) \R2 s.t. M⊖ 〈v, v′〉, S|〈v,v′〉  ϕ
M, S  〈−〉2ϕ⇔ ∃〈v, v′〉 ∈ (R1 \R2) \ Set(S) s.t. M⊖ 〈v, v′〉, S  ϕ
M, S  〈+〉ϕ⇔ ∃〈v, v′〉 ∈ R2 \R1 s.t. M⊕ 〈v, v′〉, S  ϕ
By the semantics, a propositional atom p is true at a sequence S if and only
if p is true at the last element of S. The cases for ¬ and ∧ are as usual. Formula
ϕ states that e(S) has an R1-successor v such that ϕ is true at sequence S; v.
Additionally, 〈−〉1ϕ means that after deleting a link 〈v, v′〉 from Set(S) \R2, ϕ
is true at S|〈v,v′〉. Moreover, 〈−〉2ϕ states that ϕ holds at S after cutting a link
〈v, v′〉 belonging to (R1 \R2) \Set(S). Both 〈−〉1 and 〈−〉2 require that the link
deleted cannot be an R2-edge. Intuitively, whereas 〈−〉1 depicts the case when
Teacher deletes a link from Learner’s path S, 〈−〉2 captures the situation that
the link deleted is not a part of S. Finally, 〈+〉ϕ means that after extending R1
with a new link belonging to R2, ϕ holds at the current sequence.
A formula ϕ is satisfiable if there is a pointed model 〈M, S〉 ∈ M with
M, S  ϕ. Validity in a model and in a frame is defined in the usual way. Note
that the relevant class of models to specify SLL is M•, that is, models where the
evaluation sequence S starts with a singleton. Hence SLL is the set of L-formulas
that are valid in the class M•.
For any 〈M, S〉 and 〈M′, S′〉, we say that they are learning modal equivalent
(notation: 〈M, S〉 !l 〈M′, S′〉) iff M, S  ϕ ⇔ M′, S′  ϕ for any ϕ ∈ L.
The set Tl(M, S) := {ϕ ∈ L | M, S  ϕ} is the learning modal theory of
〈M, S〉. Besides, we define a relation U ⊆M×M with 〈〈M, S〉, 〈M′, S′〉〉 ∈ U
iff 〈M′, S′〉 is 〈M⊖〈v, v′〉, S|〈v,v′〉〉 for some 〈v, v
′〉 ∈ Set(S)\R2, 〈M⊖〈v, v′〉, S〉
for some 〈v, v′〉 ∈ (R1\R2)\Set(S), or 〈M⊕〈v, v′〉, S〉 for some 〈v, v′〉 ∈ R2\R1.
We can also iterate this order, to talk about models reachable in finitely many
U-steps, obtaining the relation U∗.
2.2 Application: Winning Strategies in SLG
By Definition 4,  captures the actions of Learner, and operators 〈+〉, 〈−〉1 and
〈−〉2 characterize those of Teacher. Besides, our logic is expressive enough to
describe the winning strategy (if there is one) for players in finite graphs.3
Given a finite SLG, let p be a distinguished atom holding only at the goal
node. Generally, the winning strategy of Learner and Teacher will be of the
following form:
©0 ©1  · · · ©n (p ∧ [−]1⊥) (1)
3 Generally speaking, to define the existence of winning strategies for players, we need
to extend SLG with some fixpoint operators. We leave this for future inquiry.
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where©i is blank or one of 〈−〉1, 〈−〉2 and 〈+〉 for each i ≤ n. In this formula, the
recurring  operator depicts Learner’s actions and ©i Teacher’s response. The
proposition p signalizes Learner’s arrival at the goal, and [−]1⊥ states that there
are no edges in Learner’s path that Teacher can cut. Hence, we can conclude that
Learner has reached the goal through a sequence of correct edges. It is worth
noting that in formula (1) we use , other than , to represent Learner’s action,
although SLG is a cooperative game. Recall the graph in Figure 1. We observe
that 〈+〉〈+〉〈−〉1〈−〉2(p∧ [−]1⊥) holds at the starting node a, so there
exists a winning strategy in this specific SLG.
Remark 2. In SG we know that links cut by Teacher represent wrong inferences.
However, SG does not tell us anything about the links that remain in the graph.
Therefore, winning strategies of the players in SG cannot guarantee against
situations like Gettier cases. In contrast, the formula [−]1⊥ in (1) ensures that
Teacher is not allowed to remove any more links from Learner’s path. In SLG,
a Gettier-style case is that Learner arrives at the goal node with some 〈u, v〉 ∈
R1 \ R2 occurring in her path, so Teacher now would be allowed to cut those
links. Therefore Gettier cases cannot be winning strategies in SLG.
2.3 Preliminary Observations
As observed, the semantics of SLL is not simple. In this section, we make some
preliminary observations on SLL. In particular, we will discuss the relations
between SLL and other related logics, and present some logical validities.
First of all, we have the following result on the relation between L and
standard modal logic:
Proposition 1. Let M = 〈W,R1, R2, V 〉 be a model. For any 〈M, S〉 ∈M and
ϕ ∈ L, we have M, S  ϕ ⇔ 〈W,R1, V 〉, e(S)  ϕ∗, where ϕ∗ is a standard
modal formula obtained by replacing every occurrence of  in ϕ with ♦.
Proof. The proof is done by induction on the syntax of ϕ. The Boolean cases
are trivial. When ϕ is ψ, it holds that:
M, S  ϕ⇔ ∃v ∈ R1(e(S)) s.t. M, S; v  ψ
⇔ ∃v ∈ R1(e(S)) s.t. M, v  ψ∗
⇔ 〈W,R1, V 〉, e(S)  ϕ∗
The first equivalence follows from Definition 4 directly. By the inductive hy-
pothesis, the second one holds. The last one holds by the semantics of standard
modal logic. ⊓⊔
Therefore, essentially the fragment L of L is standard modal logic. More-
over, the operator 〈−〉2 is much similar to the sabotage operator 〈−〉:
Proposition 2. Let M = 〈W,R1, R2, V 〉 be a model, and R = R1 \R2. For any
〈M, w〉 ∈M• and ϕ ∈ L〈−〉2 , we have M, w  ϕ⇔ 〈W,R, V 〉, w  ϕ
′, where ϕ′
is a SML formula obtained by replacing every occurrence of 〈−〉2 in ϕ with 〈−〉.
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Proof. We prove it by induction on the structure of ϕ. The Boolean cases are
straightforward. When ϕ is 〈−〉2ψ, it holds that:
M, w  ϕ⇔ ∃〈v, v′〉 ∈ (R1 \R2) s.t. M⊖ 〈v, v
′〉, w  ψ
⇔ ∃〈v, v′〉 ∈ R s.t. 〈W,R \ {〈v, v′〉}, V 〉, w  ψ′
⇔ 〈W,R, V 〉, w  〈−〉ψ′
The first equivalence follows straightforward from the semantics of SLL. By the
inductive hypothesis and the definition of R, we have the second equivalence.
The last one holds by the truth condition for the sabotage modality. ⊓⊔
Next, we have the following result on the relation between L〈+〉 and the
‘bridge modal logic (BML)’ (i.e., the logic expanding the standard modal logic
with the bridge operator):
Proposition 3. LetM = 〈W,R1,W 2, V 〉 be a model. For any 〈M, S〉 ∈M and
ϕ ∈ L〈+〉, we have M, S  ϕ ⇔ 〈W,R1, V 〉, e(S)  ϕ
⋆, where ϕ⋆ is a bridge
modal formula obtained by replacing every occurrence of  in ϕ with ♦.4
Proof. This goes by induction on the syntax of ϕ. The Boolean cases are trivial.
The case for  is similar to the proof of Proposition 1. When ϕ is 〈+〉ψ, it holds
that:
M, S  ϕ⇔ ∃〈v, v′〉 ∈ (R2 \R1) s.t. M⊕ 〈v, v′〉, S  ψ
⇔ ∃v, v′ ∈ W s.t. 〈v, v′〉 6∈ R1 and 〈W,R1 ∪ {〈v, v′〉}, V 〉, e(S)  ψ′
⇔ 〈W,R1, V 〉, e(S)  〈+〉ψ′
The first equivalence follows our semantics. By the inductive hypothesis and the
definition of R2, the second one holds. The last one holds by the semantics of
bridge modal logic. ⊓⊔
From Proposition 1-3, we know that several fragments of SLL are similar to
other logics that have been studied. However, as a whole, SLL is not a loose
aggregation of these fragments: different operators interact with each other. A
typical example is that, for any 〈M, w〉 ∈M•, the formula
[−]1ϕ (2)
is valid, as Set(w) = ∅. However, formula ¬[−]1ϕ is satisfiable. This presents
a drastic difference between SLL and other logics mentioned so far: in those
logics, it is impossible that the evaluation point has access to a node satisfying
a contradiction. In order to understand how operators in SLL work, we present
some other validities of SLL.
Proposition 4. Let p ∈ P and ϕ, ψ ∈ L. The following formulas are validities
of SLL (w.r.t. M•):
p→ [−]1p (3)
4 By abuse of notation, for any ϕ ∈ L〈+〉, ϕ
⋆ is a formula of the bridge modal logic.
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p ∧ ⊤ → [−]1p (4)
p→©p © ∈ {[−]2, [+]} (5)
© (ϕ→ ψ)→ (©ϕ→©ψ) © ∈ {[−]2, [+]} (6)
n[−]1(ϕ→ ψ)→ (
n[−]1ϕ→ 
n[−]1ψ) n ∈ N (7)
n〈−〉1ϕ→ 
n+m〈−〉1ϕ n,m ∈ N (8)
n〈−〉1ϕ→
∨
m<n
m〈−〉2ϕ 1 ≤ n ∈ N (9)
Note that formulas (3)-(5) above are not schemata. Although they will still be
valid if we replace each propositional atom occurring in them with any Boolean
formula, substitution fails in the general case. In particular, we have the following
result:
Proposition 5. Validities of L〈−〉1 are not closed under substitution.
Proof. We prove it by example. Consider the general schema ϕ∧ψ → [−]1ϕ of
formula (4). Let ϕ := p and ψ := q. Define a model M as depicted in Figure
2. It holds that M, w  p ∧ q. While, since w has exactly one successor w1
and 〈w,w1〉 6∈ R2, we have M, w 6 [−]1p. ⊓⊔
w w1
p
w2
q
1 2
Fig. 2. A model of SLL
Interestingly, SLL also has other features that are very different from stan-
dard modal logic. For instance, it lacks the tree model property, which holds
directly by the following result:
Proposition 6. L〈−〉1 does not have the tree model property.
Proof. Consider the following formulas:
(T1) p ∧ p ∧ ¬p
(T2) (p→ p ∧ ¬p)
(T3) (¬p→ 〈−〉1(p ∧p))
Define ϕT := (T1∧T2∧T3). We now show that, for any modelM = 〈W,R1, R2, V 〉
and w ∈ W , ifM, w  ϕT , then R1ww. By formula (T1), node w is p, and it has
at least one p-successor w1 and at least one ¬p-successor w2 via relation R1. Be-
sides, (T2) states that, each such p-successor w1 of w also can reach some p-node
w3 and ¬p-node w4 by R1. Finally, from (T3) we know that w can only reach
one ¬p-point by R1 and that w1 does not have ¬p-successors via R1 any longer
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after cutting 〈w,w2〉. So, 〈w,w2〉 is identical with 〈w1, w4〉, which is followed by
R1ww directly.
Besides, formula ϕT is indeed satisfiable with respect to M
•. Consider the
model depicted in Figure 3. It is not hard to see that ϕT is true at w. Hence
L〈−〉1 lacks the tree model property. ⊓⊔
w
p
w1
1
1
Fig. 3. A model of ϕT .
As observed, many instances of validities in our logic are not straightforward,
and SLL has some distinguishing features. The results that we have so far are
not sufficient enough to understand SLL. In the sections to come we will make
a deeper investigation into our logic.
3 Expressive Power of SLL
In this section, we study the expressivity of SLL. First, we will show that SLL is
still a fragment of first-order logic even though it looks complicated. After this,
a suitable notion of bisimulation for SLL is introduced. Finally, we provide a
characterization theorem for the logic.
3.1 First-Order Translation
Given the complicated semantics, is SLL still a fragment of FOL? In this section
we will provide a positive answer to this question. To do so, we will describe a
translation from SLL to FOL. However, compared with that for standard modal
logic [7], we now need some new devices.
Let L1 be the first-order language consisting of countable unary predicates
Pi∈N , two binary relations Ri∈{1,2}, and equality ≡. Take any finite, non-empty
sequence E of variables. Let y and y′ be two fresh variables not appearing in
E. When there exists 〈x, x′〉 ∈ Set(E) with x ≡ y and x′ ≡ y′, we define
E|〈y,y′〉 := E|〈x,x′〉. Now let us define the first-order translation.
Definition 5 (First-Order Translation). Let E = 〈x0, x1, ..., xn〉 be a finite
sequence of variables (non-empty), and E− = {〈v0, v′0〉, ..., 〈vi, v
′
i〉} and E
+ =
{〈u0, u′0〉, ..., 〈uj , u
′
j〉} two finite sets of links. The translation T (ϕ,E,E
+, E−)
from L-formulas ϕ to first-order formulas is defined recursively as follows:
T (p,E,E+, E−) =Pe(E)
T (¬ϕ,E,E+, E−) =¬T (ϕ,E,E+, E−)
T (ϕ ∧ ψ,E,E+, E−) =T (ϕ,E,E+, E−) ∧ T (ψ,E,E+, E−)
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T (ϕ,E,E+, E−) =∃y((
∨
〈x,x′〉∈E+
(e(E) ≡ x ∧ y ≡ x′) ∨ (R1e(E)y∧
¬
∨
〈v,v′〉∈E−
(e(E) ≡ v ∧ y ≡ v′))) ∧ T (ϕ,E; y,E+, E−))
T (〈−〉1ϕ,E,E
+
, E
−) =∃y∃y′(
∨
〈x,x′〉∈Set(E)\(E−∪E+)
(y ≡ x ∧ y′ ≡ x′)∧
R1yy
′ ∧ ¬R2yy
′ ∧ T (ϕ,E|〈y,y′〉, E
+
, E
− ∪ {〈y, y′〉}))
T (〈−〉2ϕ,E,E
+
, E
−) =∃y∃y′(R1yy
′ ∧ ¬
∨
〈x,x′〉∈Set(E)∪E−∪E+
(y ≡ x ∧ y′ ≡ x′)∧
¬R2yy
′ ∧ T (ϕ,E,E+, E− ∪ {〈y, y′〉}))
T (〈+〉ϕ,E,E+, E−) =∃y∃y′(¬
∨
〈x,x′〉∈E−∪E+
(y ≡ x ∧ y′ ≡ x′) ∧ ¬R1yy
′ ∧ R2yy
′∧
T (ϕ,E,E+ ∪ {〈y, y′〉}, E−))
From the perspective of SLG, the sequence E denotes Learner’s process, and
sets E+ and E− represent the links that have already been added and deleted
respectively. In any translation τ(ϕ,E,E+, E−), each of E+ and E− may be
extended. For any their extensions E+ ∪ X and E− ∪ Y , we have X ∩ Y = ∅.
Intuitively, this fact is in line with our semantics: for any 〈〈W,R1, R2, V 〉, S〉,
we always have Set(S) ⊆ R1 and (R1 \ R2) ∩ (R2 \ R1) = ∅, therefore links
deleted are different from those added. Another point worth mentioning is that,
unlike the case of standard modal logic, generally the translation does not yield
a first-order formula with only one free variable. However, it does so when we set
E, E+ and E− to be a sequence consisting of a singleton, ∅ and ∅ respectively.
By Definition 5, we have the following result:
Lemma 1. LetM be a model and τ(ϕ,E,E+, E−) a translation s.t. E+∩E− =
∅. Assume that y and y′ are two fresh variables. For any assignment σ, we have
M⊖〈v, v′〉  T (ϕ,E,E+, E−)[σ] iffM  T (ϕ,E,E+, E−∪{〈y, y′〉})[σy(′):=v(′) ],
for any 〈v, v′〉 ∈ R1 \ R2; and M ⊕ 〈v, v′〉  T (ϕ,E,E+, E−)[σ] iff M 
T (ϕ,E,E+ ∪ {〈y, y′〉}, E−)[σy(′):=v(′) ], for any 〈v, v
′〉 ∈ R2 \R1.
Proof. The proofs for these two cases are similar. We only prove the first one.
Assume that 〈v, v′〉 ∈ R1 \ R2. For brevity, define R
−
1 := R1 \ {〈v, v
′〉}, i.e., R−1
is the relation obtained by deleting the link 〈v, v′〉 from R1 in M.
(1). When ϕ is p ∈ P, we have the following equivalences:
M⊖ 〈v, v′〉  T (ϕ,E,E+, E−)[σ]
⇔ M⊖ 〈v, v′〉  Pe(E)[σ]
⇔ M  Pe(E)[σ]
⇔ M  T (ϕ,E,E+, E− ∪ {〈y, y′〉})[σy(′):=v(′) ]
The first equivalence holds by Definition 5 directly. The second one follows from
the definition of M⊖ 〈v, v′〉. The last one follows by Definition 5.
(2). The proofs for the Boolean connectives are straightforward.
(3). ϕ is ψ. By 〈v, v′〉 ∈ R1 \ R2, the definitions of M⊖ 〈v, v′〉 and the
standard translation, it holds that:
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M⊖ 〈v, v′〉  T (ϕ,E,E+, E−)[σ]
⇔ M⊖ 〈v, v′〉  ∃u(((¬
∨
〈x,x′〉∈E−
(e(E) ≡ x ∧ u ≡ x′) ∧R−1 e(E)u)∨
∨
〈z,z′〉∈E+
(e(E) ≡ z ∧ u ≡ z′)) ∧ T (ψ,E;u,E+, E−))[σ]
⇔ M  ∃u(((¬
∨
〈x,x′〉∈E−∪{y,y′}
(e(E) ≡ x ∧ u ≡ x′) ∧R1e(E)u)∨
∨
〈z,z′〉∈E+
(e(E) ≡ z ∧ u ≡ z′))∧
T (ψ,E;u,E+, E− ∪ {〈y, y′〉}))[σy(′):=v(′) ]
⇔ M  T (ϕ,E,E+, E− ∪ {〈y, y′〉})[σy(′):=v(′) ]
(4). When ϕ is 〈−〉1ψ, we have that:
M⊖ 〈v, v′〉  T (ϕ,E,E+, E−)[σ]
⇔ M⊖ 〈v, v′〉  ∃u∃u′(
∨
〈z,z′〉∈Set(E)\(E+∪E−)
(u ≡ z ∧ u′ ≡ z′) ∧R−1 uu
′∧
¬R2uu′ ∧ T (ψ,E|〈u,u′〉, E
+, E− ∪ {〈u, u′〉}))[σ]
⇔ M  ∃u∃u′(
∨
〈z,z′〉∈Set(E)\(E+∪(E−∪{〈y,y′〉}))
(u ≡ z ∧ u′ ≡ z′) ∧R1uu′∧
¬R2uu
′ ∧ T (ψ,E|〈u,u′〉, E
+, E− ∪ {〈u, u′〉, 〈y, y′〉}))[σy(′):=v(′) ]
⇔ M  T (ϕ,E,E+, E− ∪ {〈y, y′〉})[σy(′):=v(′) ]
(5). ϕ is 〈−〉2ψ. The following equivalences hold:
M⊖ 〈v, v′〉  T (ϕ,E,E+, E−)[σ]
⇔M⊖ 〈v, v′〉  ∃u∃u′(¬
∨
〈z,z′〉∈Set(E)∪E−∪E+
(u ≡ z ∧ u′ ≡ z′)∧
¬R2uu′ ∧R
−
1 uu
′ ∧ T (ψ,E,E+, E− ∪ {〈u, u′〉}))[σ]
⇔M  ∃u∃u′(¬
∨
〈z,z′〉∈Set(E)∪E+∪(E−∪{〈y,y′〉})
(u ≡ z ∧ u′ ≡ z′)∧
¬R2uu′ ∧R1uu′ ∧ T (ψ,E,E+, E− ∪ {〈u, u′〉, 〈y, y′〉}))[σy(′):=v(′) ]
⇔M  T (ϕ,E,E+, E− ∪ {〈y, y′〉})[σy(′):=v(′) ]
(6). When ϕ is 〈+〉ψ, it holds that:
M⊖ 〈v, v′〉  T (ϕ,E,E+, E−)[σ]
⇔M⊖ 〈v, v′〉  ∃u∃u′(¬
∨
〈z,z′〉∈E−∪E+
(u ≡ z ∧ u′ ≡ z′) ∧ ¬R−1 uu
′∧
R2uu
′ ∧ T (ψ,E,E+ ∪ {〈u, u′〉}, E−))[σ]
⇔M  ∃u∃u′(¬
∨
〈z,z′〉∈(E−∪{y,y′})∪E+
(u ≡ z ∧ u′ ≡ z′) ∧ ¬R1uu′∧
R2uu
′ ∧ T (ψ,E,E+ ∪ {〈u, u′〉}, E− ∪ {〈y, y′〉}))[σy(′):=v(′) ]
⇔M  T (ϕ,E,E+, E− ∪ {〈y, y′〉})[σy(′):=v(′) ]
The proof is completed. ⊓⊔
With Lemma 1, we now can show the correctness of the translation:
Theorem 1. Let 〈M, S〉 be a pointed model and E an R1-sequence of variables
with the same size as S. For any ϕ ∈ L,M, S  ϕ iff M  T ϕ,E, ∅, ∅)[E := S].
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Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of ϕ.
(1). Formula ϕ is a propositional atom p ∈ P. By the semantics of SLL,
M, S  ϕ if and only if e(S) ∈ V (p). On the other hand, by Definition 5,
T (ϕ,E, ∅, ∅) is Pe(E). So we have M, S  ϕ iff M  T (ϕ,E, ∅, ∅)[E := S].
(2). The cases for Boolean connectives ¬ and ∧ are trivial.
(3). When ϕ is ψ, we have the following equivalences:
M, S  ϕ
⇔ ∃v ∈ R1(S) s.t. M, S; v  ψ
⇔ ∃v ∈ R1(S) s.t. M  T (ψ,E; y, ∅, ∅)[E := S, y := v]
⇔ M  ∃y(R1e(E)y ∧ T (ϕ,E; y, ∅, ∅))[E := S]
⇔ M  T (ϕ,E, ∅, ∅)[E := S]
(4). When ϕ is 〈−〉1ψ, it holds that:
M, S  ϕ
⇔ ∃〈v, v′〉 ∈ (Set(S) \R2) s.t. M⊖ 〈v, v
′〉, S|〈v,v′〉  ψ
⇔ ∃〈v, v′〉 ∈ (Set(S) \R2) s.t.
M⊖ 〈v, v′〉  T (ψ,E|〈y,y′〉, ∅, ∅)[E := S, y
(′) := v(′)]
⇔M  ∃y∃y′(
∨
〈v,v′〉∈Set(E)
(y ≡ v ∧ y′ ≡ v′) ∧R1yy′ ∧ ¬R2yy′∧
T (ψ,E|〈y,y′〉, ∅, {〈y, y
′〉}))[E := S]
⇔M  T (ϕ,E, ∅, ∅)[E := S]
(5). If ϕ is 〈−〉2ψ, then we have:
M, S  ϕ
⇔ ∃〈v, v′〉 ∈ (R1 \R2) \ Set(S) s.t. M⊖ 〈v, v′〉, S  ψ
⇔ ∃〈v, v′〉 ∈ (R1 \R2) \ Set(S) s.t. M⊖ 〈v, v
′〉  T (ψ,E, ∅, ∅)[E := S]
⇔M  ∃y∃y′(¬
∨
〈v,v′〉∈Set(E)
(y ≡ v ∧ y′ ≡ v′) ∧R1yy′ ∧ ¬R2yy′∧
T (ψ,E, ∅, {〈y, y′〉}))[E := S]
⇔M  T (ϕ,E, ∅, ∅)[E := S]
(6). If ϕ is 〈+〉ψ, then we have:
M, S  ϕ
⇔ ∃〈v, v′〉 ∈ R2 \R1 s.t. M⊕ 〈v, v′〉, S  ψ
⇔ ∃〈v, v′〉 ∈ R2 \R1 s.t.M⊕ 〈v, v′〉  T (ψ,E, ∅, ∅)[E := S]
⇔M  ∃y∃y′(R2yy′ ∧ ¬R1yy′ ∧ T (ψ,E, {〈y, y′〉}, ∅))[E := S]
⇔M  T (ϕ,E, ∅, ∅)[E := S]
This completes the proof. ⊓⊔
Note that the translation in Theorem 1 has an extra requirement on the
sequence E, i.e., Set(E) ⊆ R1. Intuitively, this restriction corresponds to the
definition of pointed models. For each 〈M, w〉 ∈ M•, any extension E′ of w
fulfils the requirement naturally by Definition 5.
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3.2 Bisimulation and Characterization for SLL
The notion of bisimulation serves as a useful tool for establishing the expressive
power of modal logics. However, it is not hard to see that SLL is not closed
under the standard bisimulation [7]. In this section we introduce a novel notion
of ‘learning bisimulation (l-bisimulation)’ tailored to our logic, which leads to a
characterization theorem for SLL as a fragment of first-order logic.
Definition 6 (l-Bisimulation). For any two models M = 〈W,R1, R2, V 〉 and
M′ = 〈W ′, R′1, R
′
2, V
′〉, a non-empty relation Zl ⊆ U∗(〈M,S〉)×U∗(〈M′,S′〉) is
an l-bisimulation between the two pointed models 〈M, S〉 and 〈M′, S′〉 (notation:
〈M, S〉Zl〈M′, S′〉) if the following conditions are satisfied:
Atom: M, S  p iff M′, S′  p, for each p ∈ P.
Zig: If there exists v ∈ W1 s.t. R1wv, then there exists v′ ∈ W1 s.t. R′1w
′v′
and 〈M, S; v〉Zl〈M
′, S′; v′〉.
Zig〈−〉1: If there is 〈u, v〉 ∈ Set(S) \ R2, then there is 〈u
′, v′〉 ∈ Set(S′) \ R′2
with 〈M⊖ 〈u, v〉, S|〈u,v〉〉Zl〈M
′ ⊖ 〈u′, v′〉, S′|〈u′,v′〉〉.
Zig〈−〉2: If there exists 〈u, v〉 ∈ (R1 \ R2) \ Set(S), then there exists 〈u
′, v′〉 ∈
(R′1 \R
′
2) \ Set(S
′) with 〈M⊖ 〈u, v〉, S〉Zl〈M′ ⊖ 〈u′, v′〉, S′〉.
Zig〈+〉: If there exists 〈u, v〉 ∈ R2 \R1, then there exists 〈u
′, v′〉 ∈ R′2 \R
′
1 with
〈M⊕ 〈u, v〉, S〉Zl〈M′ ⊕ 〈u′, v′〉, S′〉.
Zag, Zag〈−〉1 , Zag〈−〉2 and Zag〈+〉: the analogous clauses in the converse di-
rection of Zig, Zig〈−〉1 , Zig〈−〉2 and Zig〈+〉 respectively.
For brevity, we write 〈M1, w〉↔l〈M2, v〉 if there is an l-bisimulation Zl with
〈M1, w〉Zl〈M2, v〉.
The clauses for  is similar to those for the basic modality in the standard
bisimulation: they keep the model fixed and extend the evaluation sequence with
some of its R1-successors. In contrast, all of the conditions for 〈−〉1, 〈−〉2 and
〈+〉 change the model. In particular, clauses for 〈−〉2 and 〈+〉 do not modify
the evaluation sequence, while those for 〈−〉1 change both the model and the
current sequence. Now we can show the following result:
Theorem 2 (↔l ⊆!l). For any pointed models 〈M, S〉 and 〈M
′, S′〉, it holds
that: 〈M, S〉↔l〈M
′, S′〉 ⇒ 〈M, S〉!l 〈M′, S′〉.
Proof. The proof goes by induction on ϕ. Assume that 〈M, S〉↔l〈M
′, S′〉. The
Boolean cases are straightforward.
(1). ϕ is ψ. If M, S  ϕ, then there exists v ∈ R1(S) such that M, S; v 
ψ. By Zig, there exists v
′ ∈ R′1(S
′) such that 〈M, S; v〉↔l〈M
′, S′; v′〉. By
the inductive hypothesis, it holds that 〈M, S; v〉!l 〈M′, S′; v′〉, consequently,
M′, S′; v′  ψ, which is followed by M′, S′  ϕ immediately. Similarly, we can
obtain M, S  ϕ from M′, S′  ϕ by Zag.
(2). ϕ is 〈−〉1ψ. When M, S  ϕ, there exists 〈u, v〉 ∈ Set(S) \ R2 such
that M⊖ 〈u, v〉, S|〈u,v〉  ψ. By Zig〈−〉1 , there exists 〈u
′, v′〉 ∈ Set(S′) \ R′2
with 〈M⊖〈u, v〉, S|〈u,v〉〉↔l〈M
′⊖〈u′, v′〉, S′|〈u′,v′〉〉. By the inductive hypothesis,
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〈M⊖〈u, v〉, S|〈u,v〉〉!l 〈M
′⊖〈u′, v′〉, S′|〈u′,v′〉〉. So,M
′⊖〈u′, v′〉, S′|〈u′,v′〉  ψ,
which is followed by M′, S′  ϕ. In a similar way, when M′, S′  ϕ, we can
prove M, S  ϕ by Zag〈−〉1 .
(3). ϕ is 〈−〉2ψ. If M, S  ϕ, then there is 〈u, v〉 ∈ (R1 \ R2) \ Set(S) with
M⊖ 〈u, v〉, S  ψ. By Zig〈−〉2 , there exists 〈u
′, v′〉 ∈ (R′1 \ R
′
2) \ Set(S
′) such
that 〈M ⊖ 〈u, v〉, S〉↔l〈M
′ ⊖ 〈u′, v′〉, S′〉. By the inductive hypothesis, 〈M ⊖
〈u, v〉, S〉!l 〈M′⊖〈u′, v′〉, S′〉. Consequently,M′⊖〈u′, v′〉, S′  ψ. So we have
M′, S′  ϕ. Similarly, when M′, S′  ϕ, we can prove M, S  ϕ by Zag〈−〉2 .
(4). ϕ is 〈+〉ψ. When M, S  ϕ, there exists 〈u, v〉 ∈ R2 \ R1 such that
M ⊕ 〈u, v〉, S  ψ. By Zig〈+〉, there exists 〈u
′, v′〉 ∈ R′2 \ R
′
1 with 〈M ⊕
〈u, v〉, S〉↔l〈M
′ ⊕ 〈u′, v′〉, S′〉. By IH, 〈M ⊕ 〈u, v〉, S〉 !l 〈M′ ⊕ 〈u′, v′〉, S′〉.
Therefore we have M′ ⊕ 〈u′, v′〉, S′  ψ, consequently, M′, S′  ϕ. Similarly, by
Zag〈+〉, we know M, S  ϕ from M
′, S′  ϕ. ⊓⊔
Moreover, the converse direction of Theorem 2 holds for the models that are
ω-saturated. To introduce its definition, we need some auxiliary notations. For
each finite set Y , we denote the expansion of L1 with a set Y of constants with
LY1 , and denote the expansion of M to L
Y
1 with M
Y . Let x be a finite tuple of
variables. A model M = 〈W,R1, R2, V 〉 is ω-saturated if, for every finite subset
Y of W , the expansion MY realizes every set Γ (x) of LY1 -formulas whose finite
subsets Γ ′(x) are all realized in MY .
Theorem 3 (!l⊆ ↔l). For any ω-saturated 〈M, S〉 and 〈M
′, S′〉, it holds
that: 〈M, S〉!l 〈M′, S′〉 ⇒ 〈M, S〉↔l〈M
′, S′〉.
Proof. We prove this by showing that !l itself is an l-bisimulation. In what
follows, assume that E′ is an R′1-sequence of variables with the same size as S
′.
(1). For each p ∈ P, by the definition of!l, it holds directly that M, S  p
iff M′, S′  p. This satisfies the condition of Atom.
(2). Let v ∈ R1(S). We will prove that there is some v′ ∈ R′1(S
′) with
〈M, S; v〉!l 〈M′, S′; v′〉. For any finite Γ ⊆ Tl(M, S; v), the following equiv-
alences hold:
M, S  
∧
Γ ⇔ M′, S′  
∧
Γ
⇔ M′  T (
∧
Γ,E′, ∅, ∅)[E′ := S′]
⇔ M′  ∃y(R′1(E
′)y ∧ T (
∧
Γ,E′; y, ∅, ∅))[E′ := S′]
The first equivalence holds by the assumption that 〈M, S〉 !l 〈M′, S′〉. The
second one follows from Theorem 1 and the last one from Definition 5.
Since 〈M′, S′〉 is ω-saturated, there exists some y ∈ R′1(E
′) such that M′ 
T (Tl(M, S; v), E′; y, ∅, ∅)[E′ := S′]. Again by Theorem 1, there exists v′ ∈
R′1(S
′) such that 〈M, S; v〉!l 〈M′, S′; v′〉. Now the proof of the Zig clause
is completed.
(3). Similar to (2), we can prove that the Zag condition is satisfied.
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(4). Let 〈u, v〉 ∈ Set(S)\R2. We show that there exists 〈u′, v′〉 ∈ Set(S′)\R′2
such that 〈M ⊖ 〈u, v〉, S|〈u,v〉〉 !l 〈M
′ ⊖ 〈u′, v′〉, S′|〈u′,v′〉〉. Let Γ be a finite
subset of Tl(M⊖ 〈u, v〉, S|〈u,v〉), then we have the following equivalences:
M, S  〈−〉1
∧
Γ ⇔ M′, S′  〈−〉1
∧
Γ
⇔ M′  T (〈−〉1
∧
Γ,E′, ∅, ∅)[E′ := S′]
⇔ M′  ∃y∃z(
∨
〈x,x′〉∈Set(E′)
(y ≡ x ∧ z ≡ x′) ∧ ¬R′2yz∧
T (
∧
Γ,E′|〈y,z〉, ∅, {〈y, z〉}))[E
′ := S′]
The first equivalence holds straightforward from the assumption of learning
modal equivalence between 〈M, S〉 and 〈M′, S′〉. The second one follows from
Theorem 1, and the third equivalence holds by Definition 5.
Since 〈M′, S′〉 is ω-saturated, there are y, z such that 〈y, z〉 ∈ Set(E′)\R′2 and
M′  T (Tl(M⊖ 〈u, v〉, S|〈u,v〉), E
′|〈y,z〉, ∅, {〈y, z〉}))[E
′ := S′]. W.l.o.g., assume
that y and z are assigned to u′ and v′ respectively. By Lemma 1, we have 〈u′, v′〉 ∈
Set(S′) \ R′2 with M
′ ⊖ 〈u′, v′〉  T (Tl(M⊖ 〈u, v〉, S|〈u,v〉), E
′|〈y,z〉, ∅, ∅))[E
′ :=
S′]. By Theorem 1,M′⊖〈u′, v′〉, S′|〈u′,v′〉  T
l(M⊖〈u, v〉, S|〈u,v〉). Consequently,
we have 〈M⊖ 〈u, v〉, S|〈u,v〉〉!l 〈M
′ ⊖ 〈u′, v′〉, S′|〈u′,v′〉〉. Therefore, the proof
of the Zig〈−〉1 clause is completed.
(5). Similar to (4), we can prove that the Zag〈−〉1 condition is satisfied.
(6). Assume that 〈u, v〉 ∈ (R1 \R2) \Set(S). We now prove that there exists
〈u′, v′〉 ∈ (R′1 \R
′
2) \ Set(S
′) s.t. 〈M⊖ 〈u, v〉, S〉!l 〈M′ ⊖ 〈u′, v′〉, S′〉. For any
finite Γ ⊆ Tl(M⊖ 〈u, v〉, S), it holds that:
M, S  〈−〉2
∧
Γ ⇔ M′, S′  〈−〉2
∧
Γ
⇔ M′  T (〈−〉2
∧
Γ,E′, ∅, ∅)[E′ := S′]
⇔ M′  ∃y∃z(¬
∨
〈x,x′〉∈Set(E′)
(y ≡ x ∧ z ≡ x′) ∧R1yy
′∧
¬R2yy
′ ∧ T (
∧
Γ,E′, ∅, {〈y, z〉}))[E′ := S′]
The first equivalence follows from 〈M, S〉 !l 〈M′, S′〉 directly. The second
holds from Theorem 1, and the third equivalence holds by Definition 5.
As 〈M′, S′〉 is ω-saturated, there are y, z with 〈y, z〉 ∈ (R′1 \ R
′
2) \ Set(E
′)
and M′  T (Tl(M⊖ 〈u, v〉, S), E′, ∅, {〈y, z〉}))[E′ := S′]. W.l.o.g., assume that
y and z are assigned to u′ and v′ respectively. From Lemma 1, we know 〈u′, v′〉 ∈
(R′1 \R
′
2) \ Set(S
′) and M′ ⊖ 〈u′, v′〉  T (Tl(M⊖ 〈u, v〉, S), E′, ∅, ∅))[E′ := S′].
By Theorem 1, it holds that M′ ⊖ 〈u′, v′〉, S′  Tl(M⊖ 〈u, v〉, S). So, we have
〈M ⊖ 〈u, v〉, S〉!l 〈M′ ⊖ 〈u′, v′〉, S′〉. Now the proof of the Zig〈−〉2 clause is
completed.
(7). Similar to (6), we can show that Zag〈−〉2 is also satisfied.
(8). Let 〈u, v〉 ∈ R2 \ R1. We now prove that the Zig〈+〉 condition is satis-
fied. Assume that Γ is a finite subset of Tl(M⊕ 〈u, v〉, S). Then the following
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sequences hold:
M, S  〈+〉
∧
Γ ⇔M′, S′  〈+〉
∧
Γ
⇔M′  T (〈+〉
∧
Γ,E′, ∅, ∅)[E′ := S′]
⇔M′  ∃y∃z(R′2yz ∧ ¬R
′
1yz∧
T (
∧
Γ,E′, {〈y, z〉}, ∅))[E′ := S′]
The first equivalence holds by 〈M, S〉!l 〈M′, S′〉. The second one follows from
Theorem 1, and the third equivalence holds by Definition 5.
Note that 〈M′, S′〉 is ω-saturated, hence there are y, z such that 〈y, z〉 ∈
R′2\R
′
1 andM
′  T (Tl(M⊕〈u, v〉, S), E′, {〈y, z〉}, ∅))[E′ := S′]. W.l.o.g, assume
that y and z are assigned to u′ and v′ respectively. By Lemma 1, 〈u′, v′〉 ∈ R′2\R
′
1
and M′ ⊕ 〈u′, v′〉  T (Tl(M⊕ 〈u, v〉, S), E′, ∅, ∅))[E′ := S′]. By Theorem 1, it
follows thatM′⊕〈u′, v′〉, S′  Tl(M⊕〈u, v〉, S). So, we have 〈M⊕〈u, v〉, S〉!l
〈M′ ⊕ 〈u′, v′〉, S′〉. Now the proof of the Zig〈+〉 clause is completed.
(9). Similar to (8), we can show the Zag〈+〉 condition is satisfied. ⊓⊔
Thus we have established a match between learning modal equivalence and
learning bisimulation for the ω-saturated models. Now, by a simple adaptation
of standard arguments (cf. [7,5]), we can show the following result:
Theorem 4. For any α(x) ∈ L1 with only one free variable, α(x) is equivalent
to the translation of some L-formula ϕ iff α(x) is invariant under l-bisimulation.
Proof. The direction from left to right holds by Theorem 2 directly. We now
consider the other direction. Let α be an L1-formula with only one free variable.
Suppose that α is invariant under l-bisimulation. Define Cl(α) := {T (ϕ, x, ∅, ∅) |
ϕ ∈ L and α  T (ϕ, x, ∅, ∅)}. Note that any formula of Cl(α) has only one
free variable. We now show Cl(α)  α, i.e., M  Cl(α)[x := w] entails M 
α[x := w] for any 〈M, w〉 ∈ M•. To do so, we first prove that the set Σ =
T ((Tl(M, w), x, ∅, ∅)) ∪ {α} is consistent.
Suppose that Σ is not consistent. By the compactness of first-order logic, it
holds that  α → ¬
∧
Γ for some finite Γ ⊆ T (Tl(M, w), x, ∅, ∅). Then from
the definition of Cl(α), we know ¬
∧
Γ ∈ Cl(α), which is followed by ¬
∧
Γ ∈
T (Tl(M, w), x, ∅, ∅). However, it contradicts to Γ ⊆ T (Tl(M, w), x, ∅, ∅).
Now we show M  α[x := w]. Since Σ is consistent, there exists some
〈M′, w′〉 ∈ M• s.t. M′  Σ[x := w]. Consequently, 〈M, w〉!l 〈M′, w′〉. Now
take two ω-saturated elementary extensions 〈Mω, w〉 and 〈M′ω, w
′〉 of 〈M, w〉
and 〈M′, w′〉 respectively. It can be shown that such extensions always exist
(see [10]). By the invariance of first-order logic under elementary extensions,
from M′  α[x := w′] we know M′ω  α[x := w
′]. Moreover, by Theorem 3 and
the assumption that α is invariant for l-bisimulation, we have Mω  α[x := w].
By the elementary extension, we obtainM  α[x := w]. Therefore, it holds that
Cl(α)  α.
Finally, we show that α is equivalent to the translation of an L-formula.
Since Cl(α)  α, by the compactness and deduction theorems of first-order logic
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it holds that 
∧
Γ → α for some finite subset Γ of Cl(α). Besides, by the
definition of Cl(α), we have  α →
∧
Γ . Thus,  α ↔
∧
Γ . Now the proof is
completed. ⊓⊔
Therefore, in terms of the expressivity, SLL is as powerful as the one free
variable fragment of first-order logic that is invariant for l-bisimulation.
4 Model Checking and Satisfiability for SLL
In this section, we consider the the model checking problem and satisfiability
problem for SLL. Fortunately, the results that we have already shown are quite
helpful to establish the complexity result for its model checking problem. First
of all, as noted in [3], it holds that:
Theorem 5. Model checking for BML is PSPACE-complete (see [3]).
By this result, we now can show that model checking for SLL is also PSPACE-
complete.
Theorem 6. Model checking for SLL is PSPACE-complete.
Proof. An upper bound can be established bt the first-order translation given
by Definition 5, which has only a polynomial size increase. It is well-known that
model checking for FOL is in PSPACE.
Besides, an lower bound can be provided with the help of a translation f from
the bridge modal logic into the fragment L〈+〉. More precisely, f is the reverse
of the translation defined in Proposition 3. Clearly, the translation f also has a
polynomial size increase. Besides, let 〈W,R1, V 〉 be a standard relational model
and w ∈ W . It is not hard to see that 〈W,R1, V 〉, w  ϕ iff 〈W,R1,W 2, V 〉, w 
f(ϕ) (recall Proposition 3). From Theorem 5, we know that model checking for
SLL is PSPACE-hard.
Therefore, model checking for SLL is PSPACE-complete. ⊓⊔
Note that Theorem 6 also establishes an upper bound for the complexity of
SLG. Now we move to considering the satisfiability problem for SLL. In partic-
ular, we have the following result:
Theorem 7. L〈−〉1 does not enjoy the finite model property.
Proof. To prove this, we present a formula that can only be satisfied by some
infinite models. Consider the following formulas:
(F1) p ∧ q ∧ p ∧ ¬p ∧¬q
(F2) (p→ q ∧ ¬q ∧p)
(F3) (p→ (q → ¬q ∧ ¬p))
(F4) (¬p ∧ 〈−〉1(p ∧(q → p)))
(F5) (p→ (¬q → q ∧ ¬q ∧p))
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(F6) (p→ (¬q → (q → ¬q ∧ ¬p)))
(F7) (¬p ∧ 〈−〉1(¬q → (q → p)))
(Spy) (p→ (¬q → (q → 〈−〉1(¬q ∧¬q ∧ 〈−〉1(q ∧ (p ∧¬q))))))
(Irr) (p→ (q → 〈−〉1(¬q ∧¬q ∧q)))
(No-3cyc) ¬(p ∧(q → 〈−〉1(¬q ∧(¬q ∧ (p ∧¬q)))
(Trans) (p→ (q → 〈−〉1(¬q ∧¬q ∧(¬q → (q → 〈−〉1(¬q ∧¬q∧
〈−〉1(p ∧ ¬q ∧ q)))))))
Let formula ϕ∞ be the conjunction of the formulas above. We first show that
ϕ∞ is satisfiable. Consider the model depicted in Figure 4. It holds that ϕ∞ is
true at w.
Next, we prove that for any model M = {W,R1, R2, V } and w ∈ W , if
M, w  ϕ∞, then W is infinite. For brevity, define that B = {v ∈ W | v ∈
R1(w)∩ V (p)}, i.e., B is the set of the p-points that can be reached by w in one
step via R1. In what follows, we assume that all previous conjuncts hold.
By (F1), node w is (p∧q), and it cannon see any q-points via R1. In particular,
it cannot see itself via R1. Besides, w has at least one p-successor and at least
one ¬p-successor via R1, i.e., B 6= ∅ and R1(w) \B 6= ∅.
From formula (F2), we know that each element in B can see some (q ∧ p)-
point(s) and (¬q∧p)-point(s) via R1, but cannot see any ¬p-points by R1. Hence
each point in B has at least one R1-successor distinct from itself.
According to formula (F3), for any w1 ∈ B, each its R1-successor that is q
can see some ¬p-point(s) via R1, but cannot see any q-points by R1.
By (F4), it holds that R1(w) \ B 6= ∅ includes only one element. Moreover,
each w1 ∈ B can see point w via R1, and for each q-point w2 ∈ W , if w2 is a
successor of w1 via R1, then w2 must be w.
Formulas (F2)-(F4) show the properties of the (¬q ∧ p)-points which are
accessible from the point w in one step by R1. Similarly, formulas (F5), (F6)
and (F7) play the same role as (F2), (F3) and (F4) respectively, but focusing on
showing the properties of the (¬q ∧ p)-points that are accessible from w in two
steps via R1. In particular, (F7) guarantees that every (¬q ∧ p)-point w1 which
is accessible from w in two steps by R1 can also see w via R1, and that for each
q-point w2 ∈ W , if R1w1w2, then w2 must be w.
Formula (Spy) is a bit complicated. It shows that, for any two (¬q ∧ p)-
points w1 and w2 such that R1ww1 and R1w1w2, after we delete some link
〈v, v′〉 ∈ {〈w,w1〉, 〈w1, w2〉, 〈w2, w〉}, v is ¬q and does not have any q-successors.
Since w is q, v cannot be w. Besides, if 〈v, v′〉 = 〈w1, w2〉, after we cut the link
〈v, v′〉, v still have one q successor, i.e., w, so we have 〈v, v′〉 = 〈w2, ww〉. Further
more, after we delete 〈w,w1〉, w can reach a p-point w3 via R1 such that w3 has
no q successor via R1. Therefore, w3 must be w2. In such a way, (Spy) ensures
that each (¬q ∧ p)-point w1 which is accessible from w in two steps via R1 is
also accessible from w in one step via R1.
By (Irr), each w1 ∈ B is irreflexive. Finally, (No-3cyc) shows that the acces-
sibility relations of R1 cannot be cycles of length 2 or 3 in B, and (Trans) forces
the accessibility relation R1 to transitively order B.
On the Right Path: A Modal Logic for Supervised Learning 21
Hence (B,R1) is an unbounded strict partial order, thus B is infinite and so is
W . Now we know that ϕ∞ is satisfiable, and that for each 〈M, w〉, ifM, w  ϕ∞,
then M is an infinite model. This completes the proof. ⊓⊔
w p,q
v0
w0
p
w1
p
w2
p
w3
p
· · ·
Fig. 4. A model of formula ϕ∞ (every link in the model belongs to R1, and R2 = ∅).
We now proceed to show the undecidability of L〈−〉1 . To do so, we will
reduce the N ×N tiling problem to the satisfiability problem of this fragment.
A tile t is a 1 × 1 square, of fixed orientation, with colored edges right(t),
left(t), up(t) and down(t). The N ×N tiling problem is: given a finite set of tile
types T , is there a function f : N ×N → T with right(f(n,m))=left(f(n+1,m))
and up(f(n,m))=down(f(n,m+1))? This problem is known to be undecidable
([15]).
Inspired by the technique in [8], we will use three kinds of modalities s, u
and r to stand for . Correspondingly, a model M = {W,Rs, Ru, Rr, R2, V }
now has four kinds of relations. We are going to construct a spy point over rela-
tion Rs. Besides, Ru and Rr represent moving up and to the right, respectively,
from one tile to the other. Intuitively, the union of these three relations can be
treated as the R1 relation of the model. Moreover, as illustrated by the following
proof, they are disjoint with each other. So they are a partition of R1. Thanks
to this fact, we do not need any extra modalities to represent 〈−〉1.
Theorem 8. The satisfiability problem for L〈−〉1 is undecidable.
Proof. Assume that T = {T1, ..., Tn} be a finite set of tile types. For each Ti ∈ T ,
u(Ti), d(Ti), l(Ti) and r(Ti) are the colors of its up, down, left and right edges
respectively. Besides, each tile type is coded with a fixed propositional atom ti.
Now we will show that ϕT , the conjunction of the following formulas, is satisfiable
iff T tiles N ×N .
(M1) p ∧ q ∧ sp ∧ s¬p ∧s¬q ∧ s〈−〉1sp
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(M2) s(p→ s⊤ ∧s(q ∧ s¬p))
(M3) s(¬p ∧ 〈−〉1ss(q ∧ ¬s¬p))
(M4) s(p→ u⊤ ∧u(p ∧ ¬q ∧ s⊤ ∧s(q ∧ s¬p)))
s(p→ r⊤ ∧r(p ∧ ¬q ∧ s⊤ ∧s(q ∧ s¬p)))
(M5) s(¬p ∧ 〈−〉1sus¬s¬p)
s(¬p ∧ 〈−〉1srs¬s¬p)
(M6) s(p→ u(u⊤ ∧ r⊤ ∧u(p ∧ ¬q) ∧r(p ∧ ¬q)))
s(p→ r(u⊤ ∧ r⊤ ∧u(p ∧ ¬q) ∧r(p ∧ ¬q)))
(M7) s(p→ s(q ∧ 〈−〉1(¬q ∧u(sq ∧ ¬u¬sq))))
s(p→ s(q ∧ 〈−〉1(¬q ∧r(sq ∧ ¬r¬sq))))
(Spy) s(p→ us〈−〉1(s⊥ ∧ 〈−〉1(p ∧ q ∧ s(p ∧s⊥))))
s(p→ rs〈−〉1(s⊥ ∧ 〈−〉1(p ∧ q ∧ s(p ∧s⊥))))
(Func) s(p→ s〈−〉1(s⊥ ∧u〈−〉1(s⊥ ∧u⊥))
s(p→ s〈−〉1(s⊥ ∧r〈−〉1(s⊥ ∧r⊥))
(No-UR) s(p→ s〈−〉1(s⊥ ∧ursq ∧rusq))
(No-URU) s(p→ s〈−〉1(s⊥ ∧urusq))
(Conv) s(p→ s〈−〉1(s⊥ ∧ us〈−〉1(s⊥ ∧ u⊤∧
ru〈−〉1(u⊥ ∧ ss(p ∧s⊥ ∧ ru⊤ ∧ ru(p ∧u⊥))))))
(Unique) s(p→
∨
1≤i≤n
ti ∧
∧
1≤i<j≤n
(ti → ¬tj))
(Vert) s(p→
∧
1≤i≤n
(ti → u
∨
1≤j≤n, u(Ti)=d(Tj)
tj))
(Horiz) s(p→
∧
1≤i≤n
(ti → r
∨
1≤j≤n, r(Ti)=l(Tj)
tj))
Let M = {W,Rs, Ru, Rr, R2, V } be a model and w ∈ W such that M, w 
ϕT . We now show that M is a tiling of N × N . Define G := {v ∈ W | v ∈
Rs(w) ∩ V (p)} where Rs(w) = {v ∈W | Rswv}, and we will use its elements to
represent the tiles.
By (M1), node w is (p∧q), and it cannon see any q-points via Rs. So, ¬Rsww.
Besides, w has exactly one ¬p-successor (e.g., v) and some p-successor(s) via R1,
i.e., G 6= ∅ and Rs(w) \G = {v}.
By (M2), each tile w1 has some successor(s) via Rs, and each such successor
w2 is q and also has some ¬p-successor(s) via Rs. It is worth noting that (M1)
and (M2) illustrate that Rs is irreflexive.
Formula (M3) ensures that each tile w1 can see w via Rs, and that for each
(q ∧ p)-point w2 ∈W , if w2 is accessible from w1 via Rs, then w2 = w.
From (M4), we know that each tile has some successor(s) via Ru and some
successor(s) via Rr. Besides, each point that is accessible from a tile via Ru or
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Rr is (¬q ∧ p), and it has some q-successor(s) w1 via relation Rs where each w1
can see some ¬p-point(s) via Rs.
By formula (M5), each w1 ∈ W accessible from a tile via Ru or Rr can see
w by Rs. Also, for each (q ∧ p)-point w2 ∈ W , if it is accessible from w1 via Rs,
then w2 = w.
Formula (M6) ensures that each w1 ∈W that is accessible from a tile via Ru
or Rr also has some successor(s) via Ru and some successor(s) via Rr. Besides,
each its successor via Ru or Rr is (¬q ∧ p).
From formula (M7), it follows that both Ru and Rr are irreflexive and asym-
metric.
By (Spy), w is a spy point via the relation Rs.
Note that formula (M4) says that each tile has some tile(s) above it and some
tile(s) to its right. Now, with (Func), we have that each tile has exactly one tile
above it and exactly one tile to its right.
By (No-UR), any tile cannot be above/below as well as to the left/right of
another tile. Formula (No-URU ) disallows cycles following successive steps of
the Ru, Rr, and Ru relations, in this order. Moreover, (Conv) ensures that the
tiles are arranged as a grid.
Formula (Unique) guarantees that each tile has a unique type. Finally, (Vert)
and (Horiz ) force the colors of the tiles to match properly.
Thus we conclude that M is indeed a tiling of N ×N .
Next we show the other direction required for our proof. Suppose the function
f : N×N → T is a tiling of N×N . Define a modelM = {W,Rs, Ru, Rr, R2, V }
as follows:
W = (N ×N) ∪ {w, v}
Rs = {〈w, v〉} ∪ {〈w, x〉 | x ∈ N ×N} ∪ {〈x,w〉 | x ∈ N ×N}
Ru = {〈〈n,m〉, 〈n,m+ 1〉〉 | n,m ∈ N}
Rr = {〈〈n,m〉, 〈n+ 1,m〉〉 | n,m ∈ N}
R2 = ∅
V (q) = {w}
V (p) = {w} ∪ (N ×N)
V (ti) = {〈n,m〉 ∈ N ×N | f(〈n,m〉) = Ti}, for each i ∈ {1, ..., n}
V (r) = ∅, for any other propositional atoms r
In particular, w is a spy point in M. By construction, we have M, w  ϕT . ⊓⊔
By Theorem 7-8, it holds directly that:
Theorem 9. SLL lacks the finite model property, and its satisfiability problem
is undecidable.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
Summary Motivated by restrictions on learning in SG, we have extended the
game to SLG by naming right and wrong paths of learning, and let Teacher
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not only delete but also add links. Afterwards, logic SLL was presented, which
enables us to reason about players’ strategies in SLG. Besides, to understand
the new device, we provided some interesting observations and logical validities.
Next, we studied basics of its expressivity, including its first-order translation,
a novel notion of bisimulation and a characterization theorem for SLL as a
fragment of FOL that is invariant under the bisimulation introduced. Finally,
it was proved that model checking for SLL is PSPACE-complete, and via the
research on L〈−〉1 we shown that SLL does not enjoy the finite model property
and its satisfiability problem is undecidable.
Relevant and Future Research Broadly, this work takes a small step towards
studying the interaction between graph games, logics and formal learning the-
ory. We are inspired by the work on SG [19], SML [5] and their application to
formal learning theory [12]. This article is also relevant to other work studying
graph games with modal logics, such as [9,14,18,20]. Technically, the logic SLL
has resemblances to several recent logics with model modifiers, such as [2,3,4].
Besides, instead of updating links, [21] considers a logic of stepwise point dele-
tion, which sheds light on the long-standing open problem of how to axiomatize
the sabotage-style modal logics. Moreover, [21] is also helpful to understand the
complexity jumps between dynamic epistemic logics of model transformations
and logics of freely chosen graph changes recorded in current memory. Another
relevant line of research for this paper is epistemic logics. As mentioned already,
one goal of our work is to avoid the Gettier problem. Similar to this, [6] uses the
topological semantics to study the full belief.
Except what have been studied in this article, there are still various open
problems deserving to be studied. From the logic point of view, Section 2.2 shows
that logic SLL is able to express the winning positions for players in finite games,
but to capture those for infinite games, can SLL be expanded with some least-
fixpoint operators? From the translation described in Definition 5 we know that
SLL are effectively axiomatizable. However, is it possible to axiomatize the logic
via a Hilbert-style calculus? In terms of games, we do not know the complexity
of SLG, although Theorem 6 provides us with an upper bound. Besides, SLG
includes exactly two players, and it is also meaningful to study the cases that
are more general.
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